Language, Violence, and Human Rights Law by Dawes, James R
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 1
January 1999
Language, Violence, and Human Rights Law
James R. Dawes
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
James R. Dawes, Language, Violence, and Human Rights Law, 11 Yale J.L. & Human. (1999).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/1
Articles
Language, Violence, and Human Rights
Law
James R. Dawes*
Naming is violence. Among post-structuralist theorists this is an
essential and commonly invoked critical maxim. The act of naming is
a matter of forcibly imposing a sign upon a person or object with
which it has only the most arbitrary of relationships. Names produce
an Other, establish hierarchies, enable surveillance, and institute
violent binaries: Naming is a strategy that one deploys in power
relations. The violence cuts through at all levels, from the practically
political ("They are savages," "You are queer") to the ontological
* Society of Fellows, Harvard University. For reading and commenting on this essay,
thanks to Jeffrey Dolven, Nina Gourianova, Nancy Kokaz, Martha Minow, Miryam Sas,
Tamar Schapiro, Richard Weisberg, and James Willis. Special thanks to Lawrence Buell,
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(one critic writes of "the irreducibility of violence in any mark"').
Discussing the naming practices of Nambikwara children in Of
Grammatology, Jacques Derrida identifies naming as an act of
"originary violence" that is productive of both the disciplinary
violence of the law and the cognate violence of its infractions: "war,
indiscretion, rape. ' 2 Naming is authority's attempt to categorize and
control difference. For Derrida as for others, this is at the core of
post-structuralist logic.
Contrast this cluster of antifoundationalist arguments (let us call it
"theory" for simplicity's sake) to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. Article 16 of the ICCPR reads: "Everyone shall
have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the
law."3 Subsequent articles detail some of the freedoms contingent
upon this recognition of personhood, including freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion. Shortly thereafter, Article 24 establishes the
fundamental duties required of each state to promote the dignity and
worth of the children within its territory. What steps must states take
to insure the recognition of the personhood of their children?
Section 2 of Article 24 reads: "Every child shall be registered
immediately after birth and shall have a name."4 To be named is to
suffer violence; to be named is the foundation of human dignity.'
This juxtaposition calls attention to one of the most pressing ethical
questions asked today of literary and language theory.
I should begin with a word about my own attempts to categorize
and control through naming. In this Article I will use "theory" as a
term both broad and narrow in its application. It will denote a
particular stance toward referentiality that manifests itself variously
throughout the antifoundationalist practices (deconstruction,
neopragmatism, constructivism, postmodernism) generated by late-
1960s post-structuralism. Of course to define theory in such a way,
1. RICHARD BEARDSWORTH, DERRIDA AND THE POLITICAL 18 (1996). Steven Shaviro
writes: "Truth in language is always a consequence of this violent making-absent, of
domination enforced by the threat of murder. Such a relation of power, such violence, is
present in any discourse of knowledge or of truth, as in any attempt to assign identities or
names." STEVEN SHAVIRO, PASSION AND EXCESS: BLANCHOT, BATAILLE, AND LITERARY
THEORY 18 (1990). Judith Butler writes that "the vulnerability to being named constitutes a
constant condition of the speaking subject." JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A
POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIvE 30 (1997).
2. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 112 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans.,
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1976) (1967).
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 5, reprinted in
TWENTY-FOUR HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, 18,22 (Center for the Study of Human Rights
ed., 1992).
4. Id., art 24.
5. On the power of naming as a source of dignity, see JOHN R. SEARLE, THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 93-94 (1995).
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that is, inclusively by virtue of particular dominant features, is on one
level already to position oneself against it: This characterization
which glosses over radical differences between thinkers has
historically signified an intention to discredit the whole. Remaining
aware of this potential conceptual injustice I nonetheless want to
begin by using the word theory in this special sense, although as the
Article progresses I will complicate the definition by considering its
potential interpenetration with the discourse of rights to which I
have opposed it. For now, however, I want to treat "theory" and
"rights discourse" as basic terms signifying fundamentally divergent
accounts of the nature of language and its relationship to social
practice.6
"Rights discourse" refers to a set of claims (outside of the positivist
tradition) that asserts the existence of universal, morally binding
rights which inhere in the individual by virtue of a transcendent
natural or rational necessity. The philosophical grounding of rights
can take many forms: The most convincing include Kantian social
contract theory, which locates the source of moral obligation in
individual autonomy, and Habermasian ethics, which grounds our
reciprocal obligations in the foundational principles of
intersubjective discourse. Theory, in a contrast of premises, puts
forward a hypothesis about the contingency of meaning that renders
impossible the endorsement of universalizing claims. Because of this
aggressive antifoundationalism theory has found itself placed by
critics in opposition to a variety of cultural movements and academic
disciplines, but most important for our purposes is its presumed
opposition to the human rights community. Tzvetan Todorov writes:
"I am simply saying that it is not possible, without inconsistency, to
defend human rights with one hand and deconstruct the idea of
humanity with the other."8 Terry Eagleton, more impatiently,
6. For a conspectus of works concerned with the problem of identifying "theory" and
establishing its relation to social practices, some of which make convincing arguments contrary
to this essay, see DECONSTRUCTION AND PRAGMATISM (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1996); ERNEST
GELLNER, POSTMODERNISM, REASON, AND RELIGION (1992); VINCENT LEITCH,
POSTMODERNISM: LOCAL EFFECTS, GLOBAL FLOWS (1996); LITERARY THEORY'S
FUTURE(S) (Joseph Natoli ed., 1989); CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, RECLAIMING TRUTH (1996);
POSTMODERNISM AND POLITICS (Jonathan Arac ed., 1986); SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM:
BEYOND IDENTITY POLITICS (Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman eds., 1995).
7. Michel Chaouli writes of literary theory's notion of truth:
Rather than an idea of truth yielding only to the force of logic, it presupposes a truth
inextricably linked to rhetoric, and thus to the subjective and contingent distortions of
opinion, affect and taste-a notion of truth that has the natural sciences and the social
sciences holding their noses. It may not feel like it most of the time, but we are the ghosts
that haunt the rationalist disciplines; we are their worry.
Michel Chaouli, What Do Literary Studies Teach?, TIMES LIT. SuPP., Feb. 26, 1999, at 14.
8. TZVETAN TODOROV, LITERATURE AND ITS THEORISTS 190 (Catherine Porter trans.,
Cornell Univ. Press 1987).
1999l
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caricatures deconstruction by ventriloquizing it thus: "I am not for
socialism; but I am not against it either. Neither am I neither for nor
against it, nor simply for or against the whole opposition of 'for' and
'against."' 9 The essential charge for both is that theory functions as
an apology for political quietism." At the very least, rights-oriented
thinkers argue, theory can be condemned for the rhetorical larceny
of claiming the language of political terror. Its arguments and lexicon
thin out notions of violence to such a degree that the term loses all of
its normative force. If, as two literary critics characterize the
position, "writing is not so much about violence as a form of violence
in its own right," then violence is something with which we can and
indeed must live."
That theory is difficult to reconcile with a vigorous defense of
human rights may not be an unbeatable argument, but it is currently
the argument to beat. In this Article I will evaluate the case made
against theory by analyzing the role of language in social action. In
the next Part I will more fully characterize the theory/rights conflict,
and for the unfamiliar will briefly develop the political and
hermeneutic claims of theory by looking at the writings of Maurice
Blanchot and Paul de Man. I choose these thinkers not because they
are generally representative but because they are exemplary of the
features of theory I want to emphasize. In Parts Three and Four I
will turn to the work of human rights law: I will examine the norm-
9. Terry Eagleton, Deconstruction and Human Rights, in FREEDOM AND
INTERPRETATION 121, 123 (Barbara Johnson ed., 1993). See Johnson's introduction for
important commentary on the theory/rights conflict.
10. On the ethical challenges to literary theory, and more broadly on the full range of
ethical stances available to literary analysis, see Lawrence Buell, In Pursuit of Ethics, 114
PMLA 7 (1999). See also ALLAN STOEKL, POLITICS, WRITING, MUTILATION: THE CASES OF
BATAILLE, BLANCHOT, ROUSSEL, LEIRIS, AND PONGE at xii (1985). Stephen White argues
against those who would characterize postmodernism as quietistic. He argues that in
postmodernism language functions as "world-disclosing" rather than "action-coordinating"-
but that both are forms of moral responsibility:
One can say that political reflection pursued under the pull of the responsibility to act in
the world will generate cognitive machinery attuned to problems of action coordination;
and, conversely, that political reflection pursued under the pull of the responsibility to
otherness will use the world-disclosing capacity of language to loosen the hold of that
machinery, as well as of the dominant modes of identity and action coordination
connected with it.... The latter is charged with an irresponsible, apolitical aestheticism,
as it plays with the world-disclosing capacity of language and shows us no theoretically
informed way toward collective action; alternatively, it is charged with secretly desiring
an aestheticized politics that exhibits a dangerous neglect of the distinction between, say,
works of art and political action (a criticism often leveled at Nietzsche and Heidegger).
On the other hand, political reflection pursued under the pull of a responsibility to act is
charged with a conceptual imperialism that is blind to its harmful practical consequences.
STEPHEN WHITE, POLITICAL THEORY AND POSTMODERNISM 27-28 (1991).
11. Nancy Armstrong & Leonard Tennenhouse, Introduction to THE VIOLENCE OF
REPRESENTATION: LITERATURE AND THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE 2 (Nancy Armstrong &
Leonard Tennenhouse eds., 1989) (describing rather than endorsing this view).
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building function of argument and will analyze in detail the specific
linguistic strategies that underpin rights work. At the conclusion of
the Article, in the second half of Part Four, I will return to the
questions and claims of theory and will test them against the rights-
oriented model of political and linguistic action developed herein.
Does the collision between theory and rights lead to the diminution
of one or to the mutual alteration of both of their claims? In
answering this question I will focus upon the international laws of
war and in particular the Geneva Conventions, both because war and
internal armed combat are the sites of our most pressing human
rights concerns and because the international laws of war, as we shall
see, call into question most dramatically the relationship between
theories of language and the initiation of violence.12
II
The presumed theory/rights conflict manifests itself most
dramatically in what might be called the cultural relativism debate.
When the Commission on Human Rights created under the United
Nations Charter in 1947 began considering proposals for a
declaration on basic human rights, the executive board of the
American Anthropological Association issued a thinly disguised
preemptive critique of the expected document based upon the
premise that "standards and values are relative to the culture from
which they derive."" This cultural relativist critique of human rights
initiatives can be delivered in at least three ways: first, that human
rights disproportionately tend to be premised upon the values of
Western liberalism, particularly upon mythologies of the social
contract and the prioritization of the individual; 4 second, and more
12. International law is relevant to internal as well as to international conflict through the
minimal humanitarian provisions of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces on the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32-34
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3219, 3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86-88 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136-38 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,288-290 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
13. American Anthropological Association, Statement on Human Rights, 49 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 539, 542 (1947) (emphasis in original).
14. Zygmunt Bauman critiques both the social contract theory of self as well as the
communitarian vision:
In the same way as the clarion call of 'unencumbered' self served all too often to silence
the protest against the suppression of moral autonomy by the unitary nation-state, the
image of 'situated' self tends to cover up the 'communitarian' practices of similar
suppression. Neither of the two is immune to misuse; neither is properly protected
1999]
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deeply, that the concept of rights itself is a Western invention which
cannot be imposed upon other cultures without harming them, much
like the Christianity of earlier centuries; third, and deeper still, that
right and wrong do not exist objectively but are rather the expression
of particular cultural practices which consequently ought to be
considered immune to external critique. Theory in its strong form is
associated by critics with deep cultural relativism and to that degree
it is considered by many to be hostile to the promotion of human
rights. 5
Interrogatories skeptical of theory come in a variety of forms.
Does theory undermine for resistance movements the possibility of
political and rhetorical unity in the face of tyranny? How can theory
deconstruct totalizing systems of thought without also rendering
impossible any notion of the "truth" of history-a notion useful for
the condemnation of atrocity? 6  Does theory subvert the
universalizing notion of human rights without offering any effective
alternatives for promoting certain widely shared conceptions of
human dignity? 7 Questions of this sort have been taken very
seriously by literary and cultural critics, and have received a variety
of answers in a variety of contexts. Stanley Fish, for instance, has
argued from the perspective of legal pragmatism for the
nonexistence of a conflict: Antifoundationalism's revelation "that
practice is not after all undergirded by an overarching set of
immutable principles, or by an infallible and impersonal method, or
by a neutral observation language" has no significant practical
applications, and certainly none that interfere with the pursuit of
against being harnessed to the promotion of moral heteronomy and the expropriation of
the individual's right to moral judgment.
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, POSTMODERN ETHICS 47 (1993).
15. As Elvin Hatch writes, the anthropological relativist, when encountering violence that
is "an expression of the people's values," is "placed in the morally awkward position of
endorsing the infant's starvation, the rape of abducted women, the massacre of whole villages."
ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY
92-93 (1983). Zygmunt Bauman characterizes Gilles Lipovetsky as paradigmatic of the
"postmodern ethical revolution," a revolution toward a loose, "scruple-free individualism,"
and indifferent relativism. BAUMAN, supra note 14, at 2-3. For more on the perceived
problems of cultural relativism, see STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE
SPEECH: AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too 186 (1994); and GEOFFREY HARPHAM, GETTING IT
RIGHT 52-54 (1992). For an alternative view distinguishing relativism from relationism, see
KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 76 (Louis Wirth & Edward Shils trans.,
Routledge Press 1991) (1936).
16. See Saul Friedlander, Introduction to PROBING THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION:
NAZISM AND THE "FINAL SOLUTION" 1, 6-7 (Saul Friedlander ed., 1992); Carlo Ginzburg, Just
One Witness, in PROBING THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION: NAZISM AND THE "FINAL
SOLUTION", supra, at 91-95 (discussing Hayden White); see also F.R. Ankersmit,
Historiography and Postmodernism, 28 HIST. & THEORY 137 (1989).
17. I am thankful to Amanda Grzyb for her enlightening formulations of these points.
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rights."i For Gayatri Spivak and Diana Fuss, on the other hand, the
local pressures of perceived theory/rights conflicts necessitate an
exploration of the possibilities and limits of a strategic essentialism. 9
Barbara Herrnstein-Smith, insisting that the charge of quietism
illuminates not theory's inability to support moral action but rather
the foundationalist's inability to see theory from the inside, argues
that relativism can coherently structure both action and the exchange
and judgment of reasons;' Drucilla Cornell has conceptualized
deconstruction as a utopian project oriented toward a justice that
remains forever "beyond";21 and Derrida in his later work argues that
political intervention is derivable from deconstructive premises.
Indeed, it is asserted by many that a practical relevance to politics
and to questions of ethical value is one of post-structuralism's
foundational premises. Before moving into my discussion of the laws
of war, I want to analyze briefly the viability of this thesis.
Contemporary theory, no doubt, is in large part rooted in a
politically engaged response to the atrocities of fascism and the
Holocaust. The experience of World War II generated a sense of
bewildered disillusionment with previously unquestioned cultural
assumptions now revealed to be constructed artifacts (here bearing
the traces of "artifice," "artificial," and "artful");' concomitantly, it
generated among intellectuals a pandemic suspicion of the impulse
to elevate any subsequent system of discursive "artifice" to the
"true," "reliable," or "right." For Maurice Blanchot, a writer and
critic who renounced his fascism with the advent of war and joined
the French Resistance, the Holocaust was the "absolute event of
history," the moment when humanity was bound in cords of silence,
18. FISH, supra note 15, at 215; see also id. at 200-30. For Richard Rorty's critique of
Derridean theorists who believe their work has positive political significance, see Richard
Rorty, Response to Simon Critchley, in DECONSTRUCTION AND PRAGMATISM, supra note 6, at
41, 45. Geoffrey Harpham argues, on the other hand, that theory is inherently ethical. See
HARPHAM, supra note 15, at 46-47.
19. See GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL
POLITICS 197-221 (1987); see also DIANA FUSS, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE
AND DIFFERENCE (1989) (endorsing and developing Spivak's conception of strategic
essentialism).
20. See BARBARA HERRNSTEIN SMITH, BELIEF AND RESISTANCE: DYNAMICS OF
CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL CONTROVERSY 1-36, 61-72, 73-87, 118-23 (1997).
21. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT 182 (1992).
22. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority", in
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds. & Mary
Quaintance trans., 1992). For a negative appraisal of Derrida's later work, see Thomas
McCarthy, The Politics of the Ineffable: Derrida's Deconstructionism, in HERMENEUTICS AND
CRITICAL THEORY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS 146-68 (Michael Kelly ed., 1990); Mark Lilla, The
Politics of Jacques Derrida, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, June 25, 1998, at 36.
23. For a detailed analysis of the derealization of "cultural realities" associated with war,
see ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 127-29 (1985).
1999]
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when books were burned and "meaning was swallowed up."'24
Henceforth, he writes, "any text.., is empty-at bottom it doesn't
exist. 25 Blanchot argues that humans are not the structurers of
language but are themselves structured by it. Because language is
internally different-that is, since there is a fundamental and
arbitrary disjuncture between our sign-system and the world it
describes-we can rely upon no ontological certainties. After all,
every foundation is itself linguistically constructed. Even "existence,"
which we typically think of as preceding language in some fashion, is
itself a linguistically constructed concept that needs to be
questioned.26 The fundamental questions we can ask of the universe
are thus epistemological rather than ontological: In other words, the
important question is not "what do we know?" but rather "how do
we know?"
Blanchot's point, however, is not merely philosophical. As John
Treat writes, "When someone argues that a literature of atrocity is a
priori impossible because words do not, will not, suffice, that person
is also insisting that he steadfastly refuses to cooperate with any such
attempt and means for that stubborn insistence to suffice as its own
message. '27 For Blanchot, the logic of the Holocaust is a vicious
double-bind: It shatters society's frail, communally constructed
meanings by shattering language, and moreover makes impossible
any efforts at redemption through language by revealing that it was
the very systems of meaning destroyed by the Holocaust which
enabled and fostered its crimes.' "Writing is per se already (it is still)
24. MAURICE BLANCHOT, THE WRITING OF THE DISASTER 47 (Ann Smock trans., new
ed. Univ. Neb. Press 1995) (1980) (emphasis in original).
25. Id. at 10.
26. See Friedlander, supra note 16, at 5. In an argument informed by post-structuralism,
Thomas Weiskel writes: "Perhaps being and depth have no independent ontological status;
perhaps they are reifications of the signifying power, spontaneously created by the mind at the
zero degree, in the mere reflex of making absence significant." THOMAS WEISKEL, THE
ROMANTIC SUBLIME: STUDIES IN THE STRUCTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY OF TRANSCENDENCE
28 (1986).
27. JOHN TREAT, WRITING GROUND ZERO: JAPANESE LITERATURE AND THE ATOMIC
BOMB 28 (1995). John Treat writes that there are inherent "contradictions implicit in a form of
writing that would give a beginning, middle, and conclusion to events defying such narrative
domestication." Id. at 3. He continues: "No more words: language, its reliability already
devalued by philosophy, has become almost criminally suspect in the wake of world wars. It
has even collaborated in our collective victimhood. 'Speaking always involves a treason,' noted
Albert Camus." Id. at 27 (quoting Albert Camus, A Writer's Notebook, ENCOUNTER, Mar.
1965, at 25, 29). For more on the Holocaust and the ethical risks of representation, see
Geoffrey Hartman, The Cinema Animal: On Spielberg's Schindler's List, 106-07 SALMAGUNDI
127 (1995).
28. Adorno argues that foundationalism in Western philosophy is linked together with
political violence. For Adorno, writes Martin Jay, there was "a subterranean connection
between phenomenology and fascism-both were expressions of the terminal crisis of
bourgeois society." MARTIN JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF THE
FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, 1923-1950, at 7 (1973).
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violence. ' 9 "Speaking," he explains, "propagates, disseminates
[errors] by fostering belief in some truth."3 Even the smaller claims
of language-its promise temporarily to alleviate hurt, to relieve
loneliness and confusion-are for Blanchot radically suspect. Writing
about the disaster is necessarily a lie: It gives limits to the limitless,
sense to the senseless. Writing presents the "danger that the disaster
acquire meaning instead of body."'" He writes, "But the danger
(here) of words in their rhetorical insignificance is perhaps that they
claim to evoke the annihilation where all sinks always, without
hearing the 'be silent' addressed to those who have known only
partially, or from a distance the interruption of history."32
Meaningful language is suspect because it contributes to the
establishment and consolidation of regimes of power, but also
because it attempts to present as "real" an experience inaccessible to
reality, insofar as reality consists of what we can understand through
our socially preprogrammed conceptual categories. How then are we
to communicate in the shadow of the Holocaust? The only response
available to humanity is linguistic guerrilla warfare: as one critic puts
it, "to speak a language that power doesn't know."33 Blanchot's
answer is thus an escape into history's wreckage of syntax, into its
dilapidated heaps of verbiage and belief systems. He calls foremost
for passivity and lassitude, which is "the desire for words separated
from each other-with their power, which is meaning, broken, and
their composition too, which is syntax or the system's continuity ....
[Lassitude] is intensity without mastery, without sovereignty, the
obsessiveness of the utterly passive."' Blanchot's text is a collection
Blanchot's and Adomo's critique of meaning systems intersects with a diverse set of
particularist and communitarian arguments. Alasdair Maclntyre writes:
Particularity can never be simply left behind or obliterated. The notion of escaping from
it into a realm of entirely universal maxims which belong to man as such, whether in its
eighteenth-century Kantian form or in the presentation of some modem analytical moral
philosophies, is an illusion and an illusion with painful consequences. When men and
women identify what are in fact their partial and particular causes too easily and too
completely with the cause of some universal principle, they usually behave worse than
they would otherwise do.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE 221 (2d ed. 1984).
29. BLANCHOT, supra note 24, at 46.
30. Id. at 10.
31. Id. at 41.
32. Id. at 84.
33. Ann Smock, Introduction to SARAH KOFMAN, RUE ORDENER, RUE LABAT at x (Ann
Smock trans., Univ. Neb. Press 1996) (1994). Invoking Blanchot, Ann Smock celebrates Rue
Ordener, Rue Labat because it is "bathed in a lucidity unclouded by insight. No sense of
understanding or ultimate resolution-no relief, no consolation whatsoever-mars it. It is
clear." Id. at xii.
34. BLANCHOT, supra note 24, at 8, 11. John Treat explains how the experience of atrocity
can make all forms of action and organization, even explicitly pacific ones, seem absurd. See
TREAT, supra note 27, at 275.
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of fragments, of words fallen together, as poignant as cries of pain.
Like cries of pain, the text is both meaning-saturated and meaning-
resistant, both urgent and indecipherable. It is language made into a
puzzle, gesturing toward sense but never achieving it, assaulting
meaning (and thereby power) through paradox and a splintering of
grammar. It is a text that resists the reader, that refuses to open
itself. Its most simple anthem, offered up with the vulnerability of
prayer, contradicts its own enunciation: "May words cease to be
arms; means of action, means of salvation. Let us count, rather, on
disarray."35
Paul de Man, like Blanchot writing under the sign of the
Holocaust,' argues for the inevitability of rhetoric's destabilization
of meaning and function. He tracks relentlessly the proclivity of
language toward metaphor and catachreses-that is, toward
grotesque proliferation, monstrous combination, and unrestricted
mixing of modes. Stable meaning, he asserts, is continually subverted
by the uncontrollable allusiveness of the figurative language upon
which it depends. Language, he writes, "reintroduces the elements of
indetermination it sets out to eliminate."37 De Man's analysis of
metaphor is pockmarked by the ruptures of violence, by the traces of
the war he lived through. He lingers over examples that include
abortion, manslaughter, and parricide,38 examples that culminate in
describing the abstraction manufactured by language as "a monster
on which [one] then becomes totally dependent and does not have
the power to kill."39 He speaks of "epistemological damage,"' of
"policing the boundaries"'" of words, of impressions being "locked
up" by understanding in a "potentially violent and authoritarian
way," 2 of the "directly threatening"43 aspect of our metaphorical
35. BLANCHOT, supra note 24, at 11. On this stylized breakdown of grammar, see also
SHOSHANA FELMAN & DORI LAUB, TESTIMONY: CRISES OF WITNESSING IN LITERATURE,
PSYCHOANALYSIS, AND HISTORY 37 (1992); TREAT, supra note 27, at 32, 59. For what Sartre
called Georges Bataille's "hatred" of language, see MICHP-LE H. RICHMAN, READING
GEORGES BATAILLE: BEYOND THE GIFr 112-38 (1982). For more on antifoundationalism and
indescribability in Blanchot, see SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 1-34.
36. Throughout his life, de Man kept secret his early fascist political alignment. For
arguments that see his theory as a repudiation of these earlier views, along with arguments that
see it as an extension, see RESPONSES ON PAUL DE MAN'S WARTIME JOURNALISM (Werner
Hamacher et al. eds., 1989).
37. Paul de Man, The Epistemology of Metaphor, in AESTHETIC IDEOLOGY 34, 48
(Andrzej Warminski ed., 1996).
38. See id. at 40-41.
39. Id. at 44.
40. Id. at 34.
41. Id. at 39.
42. Id. at 44.
43. Id. at 46.
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construction, and finally of the "disfiguring power of figuration"'
which is set against "totalizing systems""5 of meaning (meaning now
permanently stained with the traces of the totalitarian). Playing on
the double meaning of "passage" (the act of passing/a section of
text), de Man writes: "Motion is a passage and passage is a
translation; translation, once again, means motion, piles motion upon
motion."' Translation creates only "the fallacious illusion of
definition," for the translation itself may be translated, and meaning
is thus perpetual motion.47
For many literary and cultural critics following de Man the
discovered motion and free play of language has functioned as a
sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit normative value. Contingency
is taken to represent a complex form of liberation; identification of a
lack has become a celebration." This is a core concern for those who
experience the dissolution of meaning through the slippage of
language as a threat. If Blanchot's anti-manifesto is perceived as
quietistically redefining the political prisoner's silence and structured
social alienation as a sort of moral victory, 9 then certain rhetorics
derived from de Man seem unintentionally to sanction power's
44. Id. at 49.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 38.
47. Id. On non-referentiality and de Man, see Stanley Cavell, Politics as Opposed to What?,
9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 157 (1982).
48. Elsewhere de Man asserts the salubrious quality of theory's dismantling of socially
accepted interpretations and meaning. See PAUL DE MAN, THE RESISTANCE TO THEORY 11
(1986). Terry Eagleton traces this tendency to the French semiotic journal Tel Quel. He argues
that the association of meaning with a violent rigidity and the implicit celebration of the free
play of the signifier "is a latently libertarian theory of the subject, which tends to 'demonize'
the very act of semiotic closure and uncritically celebrate the euphoric release of the forces of
linguistic production. It occasionally betrays an anarchic suspicion of meaning as such; and it
falsely assumes that 'closure' is always counterproductive." TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY
196-97 (1991). For a broader historical view, see id. at 106-07, 186. Christopher Norris argues
similarly against the assumption that "values like truth, reason and critique are on the side of a
repressive 'monological' discourse that entertains no question as to its own grounding
rationale," as well as against its counterpart assumption that "there is no principle of justice
more important than the maintenance of a pluralist ('language-games') approach that
acknowledges the range of incommensurable values, beliefs or criteria, and which thus makes a
virtue of abstaining from judgments of determinate truth and falsehood." CHRISTOPHER
NORRIS, UNCRITICAL THEORY 79, 177 (1992). The postmodernist mistake is, according to
Norris, a matter of confusing epistemology and ontology, or the limits of human understanding
and the existence of a real world. See id. Norris specifically relates his critique to war
representation by centering it in Baudrillard's postmodern evaluation of the hyperreality of the
Gulf War. See id. at 122. For a critique of the perceived excesses of postmodernism as applied
to the study of war, see Jane Caputi, Book Review, 47 AM. Q. 165 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM
CHALOUPKA, KNOWING NUKES: THE POLITCS AND CULTURE OF THE ATOM (1992)); see also
Cathy Caruth, The Claims of Reference, 4 YALE J. CRITICISM 193 (1990) (analyzing de Man's
treatment of the concept of referentiality in literary theory).
49. On the problem in Blanchot of embracing constructive political action with a
purportedly apolitical deconstructive method, see STOEKL, supra note 10, at 22-36.
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victory over meaning by validating the communicative misfires and
slippages that render so difficult the faltering human effort toward
consensually shared rather than externally imposed values and order.
These are important concerns. But what if we turned away from
arguments thus bounded by a reactive framework? What would it
mean instead to invert theory's premises, and to pursue its questions
by turning them inside out? Is language violent because it names, or
is violence released precisely when language fails to name
effectively? As we shall see, force assiduously defends its right to be
arbitrary against the concretized discursive structures that challenge
and attempt to constrain it. Excessively pliable hermeneutics,
therefore, might very well play into the cultural logic of violence. In
the sections that follow I will investigate this possibility by looking at
discursive strategies and language artifacts which, like photographic
negatives of theory's dismantling of referentiality, depend upon and
celebrate language's capacity effectively to refer and which demand
of their readers a "less moveable" hermeneutic practice. °
III
Theories of language that bear upon the fragility of meaning and
the breakdown of intersubjective consensus are, at their extreme,
intimately connected to theories of war. Elaine Scarry has called war
a "crisis of substantiation," a conflict in which previously shared
meanings have become so derealized and confused that they can no
longer be resolved through argument and negotiation." When
language and the agreements dependent upon it are divested of force
(such force being based upon the broad consensual agreement to
perceive the language as a form of force), then violence becomes,
typically, the first resort in reachieving clarity and agreement. One
primary response to the historical ascendance of force over
discourse, as we have seen, has been to treat language as frail and
suspicious. An alternative response has been to seek methods of
employing language that make it more likely to resist derealization,52
50. For a case study of such a relation between language theory and political praxis, see
RICHARD WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE 386-429 (1996).
51. SCARRY, supra note 23, at 127.
52. For examples, see ELAINE SCARRY, Introduction to LITERATURE AND THE BODY:
ESSAYS ON POPULATIONS AND PERSONS at vii (1988); SCARRY, supra note 23, at 192, 269-70.
Scarry writes on the work of stablizing language:
In this closed world [of torture] where conversation is displaced by interrogation, where
human speech is broken off in confession and disintegrates into human cries, where even
those cries can be broken off to become one more weapon against the person himself or
against a friend, in this world of broken and severed voices, it is not surprising that the
most powerful and healing moment is often that in which a human voice, though still
severed, floating free, somehow reaches the person whose sole reality had become his
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and also to reinscribe violence itself within the bounds of language,
to make war (a state of transitionality or suspension of meaning-
literally, meaninglessness) into a site of unalterable meanings,
agreements, and definitions. It is to this realm of covenants and
rights that I now turn.
Silent enim leges inter arma.53 Cicero's maxim translates: "In time
of war the law is silent" (leges, or literally, any set form of words).
War impairs the human power to describe, define, or narrate. At the
broadest level, war interrupts history. Is the Confederate soldier a
patriot or a traitor? History-as-description can only recommence
after the conflict, when war's "reality duel" or "contest to out-
describe" has ceased, and the victor can promulgate the official
version.4 War interrupts intersubjective evaluation and, at the most
personal level, interrupts self-narration.5 What is the moral
significance of reprisal executions of prisoners designed to prevent
further executions of one's own captured soldiers? Or the
bureaucratic decision to bomb a munitions factory in a civilian-dense
area? And what moral code can guide my behavior? Am I "good" to
kill a man ("brave," "heroic") and "bad" to show mercy
("cowardly," "treacherous")? Familiar moral codes cease to apply at
the outbreak of hostilities. Many interpret this absence of a guide as
a license to act without restraint. The impossibility of describing an
event (good or bad, legal or illegal, heroic or treacherous) is the
enabling condition of war's entropic cruelty. Silent enim leges inter
arma.
Shortly after he assumed control of Atlanta, Union General
own unthinkable isolation, his deep corporeal engulfment.... [I]n acknowledging and
expressing another person's pain, or in articulating one of his nonbodily concerns while
he is unable to, one human being who is well and free willingly turns himself into an
image of the other's psychic or sentient claims, an image existing in the space outside the
sufferer's body, projected out into the world and held there intact by that person's
powers until the sufferer himself regains his own powers of self-extension.
Id. at 50. See also Hayden White, Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth, in
PROBING THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION 37, 44-47 (discussing BEREL LANG, ACT AND
IDEA IN THE NAzI GENOCIDE (1990)).
53. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, THE SPEECHES OF CICERO: PRO T. ANNIO MILONE 6, 16
(N.H. Watts trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1953).
54. SCARRY, supra note 23, at 130, 131.
55. Blanchot emphasizes our inability to understand traumatic experiences in the moments
of their occurrence, as well as our inability to integrate them into a personal history of serial
"present" moments. He writes:
The disaster does not put me into question, but annuls the question, makes it disappear-
as if along with the question, "I" too disappeared in the disaster which never appears.
The fact of disappearing is, precisely, not a fact, not an event; it does not happen, not
only because there is no "I" to undergo the experience, but because (and this is exactly
what presupposition means), since the disaster always takes place after having taken
place, there cannot possibly be any experience of it.
BLANCHOT, supra note 24, at 28.
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William T. Sherman ordered the expulsion of all Southern families
from the city. "War is cruelty," he declared in a public letter directed
to Mayor James Calhoun and his two councilmen, "and you cannot
refine it." 6 In a bitter response to Sherman's then unprecedented
decision to make civilians into targets of the war, Confederate
General J.B. Hood asserted: "[T]he [mass expulsion] you propose
transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before
brought to my attention in the dark history of war." 7 The forced
exodus, he argued, contradicted the customs of war and "the laws of
God and man." 8 Sherman countered by characterizing all of war's
brutalities as "inevitable": "You might as well appeal against the
thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war. 59 "If we
must be enemies," he writes, "let us be men, and fight it out as we
propose to do, and not deal in such hypocritical appeals to God and
humanity."' Often cited as natural truths of war, Sherman's brutal
aphorisms are better described as a statement of deliberate policy, as
mystifications of agency designed to justify the choice to make the
theater of war a site of maximal moral chaos and lawlessness. Earlier
in the war, in a private letter to General Halleck, his superior at the
time, Sherman found it necessary to argue strenuously in favor of
amplifying and exaggerating the hardships of war. The magisterial
declaratives of his Atlanta declaration are now replaced by a series
of conditionals and subjunctives:
In accepting war, it should be "pure and simple" as applied to
the belligerents. I would keep it so, till all traces of the war are
effaced; till those who appealed to it are sick and tired of it, and
come to the emblem of our nation, and sue for peace. I would
not coax them, or even meet them half-way, but make them so
sick of war that generations would pass away before they would
again appeal to it.61
56. WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN, MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W.T. SHERMAN 601
(Library of America, 3d ed. 1990) (1875).
57. Id. at 593.
58. Id. at 595.
59. Id. at 601.
60. Id. at 594-95. For more on the debates during the Civil War over what was appropriate
conduct, see JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 501-
02, 778, 794, 811 (1989). One of the war's great ironies is that Sherman saw his lawlessness in
war as serving the cause of law and order in peace. See SHERMAN, supra note 56, at 135-43,
382.
61. SHERMAN, supra note 56, at 365. While Sherman was very blunt about the aims of war
when discussing policy, he often resorted to obfuscation when representing violence. This was
a tendency Clausewitz resisted on all levels. Describing his aims in On War, he writes: "We
also sought to strip away the vague, ambiguous notions commonly attached to them, and tried
to make it absolutely clear that the destruction of the enemy is what always matters most."
228
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Sherman was aware of the rhetorical subterfuge of his Atlanta
declaration. He was also aware that the subterfuge was likely to
work, that civilians would be poorly equipped to resist the
superimposition of his particular narrative model-that is, his
invasion is more like a "thunder-storm" than like a "crime.
62
Civilian vulnerability to the strategic narrative manipulations of
warfare is due primarily to the essential epistemological confusion of
war, but also to the paucity of publicly-sanctioned, alternative
narrative models available to the disempowered populace. The
tyrannical violence of war in its emergency disrupts borders and
epistemological categories; it also mutes the human creativity that
enables us continually to reconceptualize our world in ways that
make it amenable to our shaping.
As Hood's rejoinder to Sherman illustrates, one primary response
to this narrative bewilderment, as old as war itself, has been the
attempt to regulate conduct in war through pre-established customs
and agreements-that is, to transform war into a self-narrating event
by establishing inviolable categories of persons and actions that can
stand as a guide to the incidents of war. Posed against war's chaos is
the human will to order, manifest most dramatically in what are
called "the laws of war." In instances when such laws are publicly
validated and accessible, resistance is possible. In the context of an
intersubjective consensus on normative discourse, the act of
articulation becomes an. experience in constraint. "Moral talk is
coercive," as Michael Walzer argues.63 It forces us to tell a very
special story to justify our actions, a story that is vulnerable to all the
rules of evidence and credibility. An invasion that is called just is not,
to paraphrase Walzer, an invasion that simply enjoys approbation; it
is an invasion that enjoys approbation for particular reasons, and
anyone asserting its "justice" is required to provide particular sorts
of evidence. ' Moral talk constrains what we can say, even in the face
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 577 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans., Princeton
Univ. Press 1976) (1832).
62. Sherman employed this metaphor frequently. See, e.g., GERALD F. LINDERMAN,
EMBATTLED COURAGE: THE EXPERIENCE OF COMBAT IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 209
(1987).
63. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 12 (1977).
64. See id. at 12-13. Moral articulation motivates in a positive manner as well, as Charles
Taylor explains:
Moral sources empower. To come closer to them, to have a clearer view of them, to come
to grasp what they involve, is for those who recognize them to be moved to love or
respect them, and through this love/respect to be better enabled to live up to them. And
articulation can bring them closer. That is why words can empower; why words can at
times have tremendous moral force.
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of what might be our overwhelming and unrelenting power. One
year before the sacking of Atlanta, Dr. Francis Lieber had drawn up
for the Union army the first national manual outlining the laws of
land warfare. Article 22 reads: "[T]he unarmed citizen is to be spared
in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will
admit."65 Article 23 continues: "[T]he inoffensive individual is as
little disturbed in his private relations as the commander of the
hostile troops can afford to grant."'  The details of regulations
throughout are accompanied by the language of moral responsibility:
"As Martial Law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon
those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of
justice, honor, and humanity-virtues adorning a soldier even more
than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of
his arms against the unarmed";67 "Men who take up arms against one
another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral
beings, responsible to one another and to God."' Resistance for the
citizens of Atlanta was thus possible.69 Overlapping vocabularies
between North and South opened up a space for argument, a
language event which much like violence can forcibly bring about
outcomes in the world but which does so, unlike violence, without
the use of injury.7' Argument can function, moreover, to vivify
normative values: One reinforces the legitimacy of particular moral
obligations even if one enters into rational discourse only to assert,
disingenuously, that one has not violated them. At the conclusion of
Sherman's public epistolary debate with Hood (the letters were
published in Macon newspapers), the Northerner was forced to
acquiesce.71 He did so partially, tersely, and negatively -cruelty
65. Francis Lieber, Lieber Instructions 1863, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS 3, 7 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1981).
66. Id. at 7.
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Explicit public formulation of submerged norms does not only clarify but also changes
a group's moral relationship to its actions. The Nuremberg Trials are a testament to the
capacity of intersubjective evaluative persuasion. By the end of the trials many of the architects
of the Holocaust publicly apologized for their activities and expressed a sense of surprise over
what they had done. See, e.g., ALBERT SPEER, INSIDE THE THIRD REICH 375, 519-20 (Richard
& Clara Winston trans., Avon 1970).
70. Argument ideally conceived is illuminated by Stanley Cavell's distinction between the
moralist and the propagandist, between convincing and persuading. The former, Cavell argues,
appeals to a person through reasons normatively conceived and attempts to make her see a
particular position while also respecting her autonomy as a moral agent. The latter is
concerned only with causing a certain set of actions or behaviors, and uses reasons as well as
"appeals to his fears, your prestige, or another's money" without distinctions in legitimacy.
STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 278 (1979).
71. During the debate, Sherman attempted to justify his assertion that any action he might
take was permitted by conflating two distinct moral traditions: jus in bello, or the justice of
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could be refined; he was not free to do anything-by acknowledging
the potentially "binding" power of the laws of war in a denial that he
had violated the requirements of the texts. "I was not bound by the
laws of war to give notice of the shelling of Atlanta, a 'fortified town,
with magazines, arsenals, founderies, and public stores;' you were
bound to take notice. See the books."' With all the power of an
absolute dictator, Sherman was forced to retreat, to abandon his
previously abstract characterizations of war and respond to the
precise, publicly accessible charges of his enemy.73
The international laws of war have a long history, dating back to
the religious contracts of the Middle Ages and the birth in Europe of
international law with writers like Giovanni da Legnano and Hugo
Grotius. Their appearance as we know them, in the shape of binding
multilateral agreements like the Geneva Conventions, is much more
recent. In 1862 Henry Dunant published Un Souvenir de Solferino,74
a harrowing account of his experiences attending to the thousands of
French and Austrian wounded from the battle of Solferino. The
book detailed the primitive, haphazard conditions of field medicine,
and exposed to the public the disastrous consequences of the
Napoleonic Wars, which had brought to an end the customary
practice of treating enemy wounded and medical personnel as
neutral parties. Now they were simply easy targets: Armies regularly
shelled field hospitals and fired upon doctors and stretcher-bearers.75
Medical personnel thus often were forced to retreat at the approach
of the enemy, leaving the wounded to lie where they fell, untended
and helpless. Dunant's expos6, and the necessary reforms indicated
particular conduct during war, and jus ad bellum, or the justice of particular causes for war.
Because the Southern cause was unjust, Sherman implied, their rights were revoked. See
SHERMAN, supra note 56, at 594. Hood responded by reminding Sherman that the causes for
war (jus ad bellum) were the concerns of statesmen; battle commanders could only concern
themselves with conduct during war (jus in bello). See id. at 596. The mayor of Atlanta
followed this with a suasive appeal detailing the varieties of human degradation the expulsion
would cause. However briefly (and inconsistently), the Southerners invoked a moral
"proceduralism" that has been central to the development of modem human rights, a
proceduralism that enfolds within itself the implied substantive value of the equal, inalienable
moral worth of all humans in all circumstances, regardless of ideological or moral taint or
positioning.
72. SHERMAN, supra note 56, at 602.
73. For an analysis of the opposing views and practices of jus in bello during the Civil War,
see LINDERMAN, supra note 62, at 181-213.
74. J. HENRY DUNANT, A MEMORY OF SOLFERINO (1939).
75. See FRrrs KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 8 (1987). W.B. Gallie
argues that the Napoleonic Wars initiated a new epoch in war-making. Previously wars had
been accepted as part of the unchangeable international landscape. The unprecedented
atrocities of the Napoleonic Wars, Gallie argues, forced communities to interrogate their
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therein,76 had a prodigious influence in mid-nineteenth-century
Europe. With Dunant's leadership it took less than two years to form
an international committee for treatment of the wounded (later
renamed the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the
ICRC) and to convene an international diplomatic conference that
quickly adopted the first of the Geneva Conventions. The 1864
"Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
in Armies in the Field" was an international watershed: It
reestablished the neutrality of medical personnel, dictated that all
wounded soldiers be collected and cared for equally, and introduced
the custom of distinguishing medical personnel from combatants
with the use of flags and armbands bearing a red cross on a white
ground.'
Two humanitarian imperatives, corresponding to two legal
traditions, have developed out of the original conventions. The law
of Geneva concerns the targets of attack, or whom one can
legitimately aim at: It dictates that a distinction be drawn between
combatants and persons "hors de combat" (civilians, wounded, etc.)
and requires that every effort be made to spare the lives of the latter.
The law of the Hague concerns the method of attack: It prohibits, for
instance, the use of weapons that "uselessly aggravate"78 the
suffering of the enemy or that "render their death inevitable."79 Since
1864 these principles have been expanded and reaffirmed in a series
of conventions that have increased limitations on methods of attack
and augmented protections for non-combatants. By the mid-1950s,
four major Geneva Conventions had been passed (dealing with the
wounded and sick on land, the wounded, sick, and ship-wrecked at
sea, prisoners of war, and protected civilians), and the law of the
Hague had been expanded with bans on chemical and bacteriological
weapons and a convention for the protection of cultural property
during wartime."
76. See DUNANT, supra note 74, at 86-95.
77. For a concise history of the modem development of the laws of war, see KALSHOVEN,
supra note 75, at 8-23.
78. Id. at 22.
79. Id. at 12.
80. Language is deployed to construct the boundaries within which war is waged. On the
creation of a public sphere, Hannah Arendt writes:
The law originally was identified with this boundary line [between one household and
another], which in ancient times was still actually a space, a kind of no man's land
between the private and the public, sheltering and protecting both realms while, at the
same time, separating them from each other. The law of the polis, to be sure, transcended
this ancient understanding from which, however, it retained its original spatial
significance. The law of the city-state was neither the content of political action.., nor
was it a catalogue of prohibitions .... It was quite literally a wall, without which there
might have been an agglomeration of houses, a town (asty), but not a city, a political
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The originary principle of jus in bello laws of war is, as the ICRC
summarized it in 1965, that "the right of the parties to a conflict to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.""s The radical,
counter-intuitive nature of this formulation is underscored when
juxtaposed to more familiar arguments of "realists" like Clausewitz,
who wrote in the early 1800s: "Attached to force are certain self-
imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known
as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it."'
Importantly, it has been a widely shared philosophical premise for
the Geneva Conventions that the protections granted to soldiers and
civilians are rights inhering in the individual rather than indulgences
granted out of the pity or benignity of states. s3 The law is not
formulated to maximize a particular conception of social welfare, but
rather to respect the obligations of justice. It is not a matter of
pursuing the good, but rather of demanding the right. This is, for
many, the premise of all international human rights law, which posits
itself (again, outside of the positivist tradition) as a series of binding
norms that transcend state interests rather than as a series of
agreements derived from the consent of the states involved.
Prior to World War II, international law had affirmed the notion
that we are, in Walker and Mendlovitz's phrase, citizens first and
humans second'-indeed, that our status as humans is in some way
contingent upon membership in a state." The galvanization of the
universal human rights movement after the atrocities of World War
II led to a radical rethinking of the scope of international law and to
a new imagination of the organizing principles of the world's people.
The notion of the world as a collection of reified, absolutely
independent states fiercely protective against encroachments upon
their sovereignty began to be replaced by the idea of a society of
community.
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 63-64 (1989). Arendt goes on to trace the Greek
roots of the word for law, pointing out its relationship both to dwelling space and the idea of a
hedge or boundary line. See id.
81. KALSHOVEN, supra note 75, at 22.
82. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 61, at 75. "If war was an act of force, Clausewitz could
discern no logical 'internal' or self-imposed limits on the use of force." Peter Paret,
Introduction to id. at 20.
83. Against this view of binding transnational norms and customs is the tendency,
instantiated in the Charter of the United Nations, to view the world as morally organized and
organizable only through the unit of the nation-state. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON
THE LAW OF NATIONS 68,103-04 (1990).
84. See R.B.J. Walker & Saul H. Mendlovitz, Interrogating State Sovereignty, in
CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES: REDEFINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY (R.B.J. Walker & Saul
H. Mendlovitz eds., 1990).
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societies, a community of mutually dependent states institutionally
imbricated through a variety of international bodies (anticipated in
the post-World War I League of Nations). This modern invention of
transnationally binding human rights has generated two very
different views of the potency and relevance of international law.
Judge Antonio Cassese, President of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, writes that universal human
rights (in conjunction with the doctrine of the self-determination of
peoples) "have subverted the very foundations of the world
community, by introducing changes, adjustments and realignments to
many political and legal institutions."'" Like a "powerful corrosive,"
rights theory must over time dissolve the "pillars of traditional
power."' Raymond Aron, however, characterizes the force of human
rights law differently. International society, he argues, is "an
anarchical order of power" where violence settles questions of what
is right.' Treaties lacking enforcement mechanisms are irrelevant to
global processes. Or as Thomas Hobbes wrote: "Covenants without
the Sword are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at
all."' It is precisely this radical disparity between viewpoints that
makes international law so relevant to the considerations of literary
theory. It is the limit case of the relationship between words and
actions, between discursive structures and the dictates of physical
violence.
In The Bridge on the River Kwai,9 a classic representation of the
treatment of prisoners of war and an unparalleled film study of the
relationship between unrestrained force and unenforceable law, a
captured British company is brought to a Japanese prison camp in
the heart of an impenetrable forest. When the camp commander,
Colonel Saito (Sessue Hayakawa), orders the British officers to
perform manual labor alongside their men, the British commander,
Nicholson (Alec Guinness), confidently informs him that such a
directive is expressly forbidden by the Geneva Conventions. He
hands to Colonel Saito his own well-worn copy of the Conventions as
evidence. Colonel Saito patiently reads it, rolls it up and strikes
Nicholson in the face with it, throws it into the dirt, and orders his
soldiers to shoot Nicholson and his fellow officers on the count of
three. The line of blood which runs down the center of Nicholson's
face physically doubles the bright red spine of his copy of the
86. ANTONIO CASSESE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD 22 (1990).
87. Id. at 23.
88. Raymond Aron, The Anarchical Order of Power, in CONDITIONS OF WORLD ORDER
25, 25 (Stanley Hoffmann ed., 1968).
89. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 223 (Penguin Books 1968) (1651).
90. THE BRIDGE ON THE RIVER KWAI (Horizon Pictures 1957).
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Conventions. In this moment the man has become the document, but
the document no longer represents the accumulated weight of
national wills. It is, instead, disposable paper. "Do not speak to me
of rules," Colonel Saito says with contempt. "This is war. This is not
a game of cricket." In short, the laws of war are widely regarded as a
laudable exercise at the same time that they are seen in practice as
essentially futile and perhaps even pathetic. The effectiveness during
wartime of any pre-war convention is certainly open to question, for
in war it is precisely this right to mandate law that is being struggled
for through violence. While Sherman may have been philosophically
and morally wrong to claim that one cannot refine the cruelty of war,
he may have been for all practical purposes empirically right. The
record of modern war's infamy is compelling argument. Yet the
salience of violations (the decision to torture a prisoner, execute the
wounded, shell a civilian neighborhood) combined with the general
non-reportability of instances of self-enforcement (the decision not
to harm a prisoner, to show mercy to the wounded, to circumvent a
civilian neighborhood) creates a distorted picture." Furthermore, the
tortured lengths to which state governments go in order to argue that
they are not in violation of the laws of war evidence the effective
pressure of these laws, if only negatively.' In an early 1950s conflict
between the Netherlands and Indonesia, for example, the
Netherlands defended its refusal to apply the Prisoners of War
Convention of 1949 to captured Indonesian infiltrators because, as it
argued, both nations chose not to recognize the dispute as an armed
conflict. The law stated that the Convention should apply "even if
the state of war is not recognized by one of [the parties]" -it did not
say "one or more."93 This revision was made shortly after the
Indonesian conflict, as the language struggled to keep pace with the
efforts to obfuscate it.' In the end, at the ICRC's insistence (an
insistence entirely lacking in any enforceability), the Dutch
government retreated from its position and began to apply the
Convention to Indonesian prisoners. Why? Why would any nation
91. On the occurrence of altruism in war, see J. GLENN GRAY, THE WARRIORS:
REFLECTIONS ON MEN IN BATTLE 100 (1973).
92. H.L.A. Hart points out:
What [international laws] require is thought and spoken of as obligatory; there is general
pressure for conformity to the rules; claims and admissions are based on them and their
breach is held to justify not only insistent demands for compensation, but reprisals and
countermeasures. When the rules are disregarded, it is not on the footing that they are
not binding; instead efforts are made to conceal the facts.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 214-15 (1961). Relatedly on rules, see JACK KNIGHT,
INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 66-73 (1992).
93. Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136.
94. See KALSHOVEN, supra note 75, at 27. For more on the attempt linguistically to
camouflage war, see JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 89 (1995).
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struggling for its vital interests and even survival inhibit itself at the
request of a disinterested and completely powerless third party? The
power of the laws of war is the power, small and defiant, of speech in
the face of overwhelming physical force. The documents of
international jurisprudence, and the extreme pressure brought to
bear upon them by the outbreak of war, thus reveal much not only
about the relationship between language and physical violence, but
also about the interior structure of each.
IV
The laws of war are derived from the notion that language,
deployed in a particular fashion, can be made equivalent to force-
or rather, can so effectively inhibit the reflex toward violence that
disputes instead can be resolved, as Jirgen Habermas has put it,
through the "unforced force of the better argument."95 As a
reference point of communal judgment, the Geneva Conventions
achieve effectiveness in a variety of ways: binding nations to certain
behaviors by standing as a reminder of their consent to be bound
thus, for instance,96 or providing interested parties with universally
accepted standards and vocabularies for mounting critiques
(critiques that implicitly threaten resistance by and ostracism from
the community of nations).' As isolated textual artifacts rather than
as tools of institutionally imbricated communal interaction, however,
the Conventions rely upon far different strategies of self-realization:
namely, a structure of repetition, and a style of comprehensiveness
and referential clarity.
95. JORGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 107
(Frederick Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1987) (1985).
96. Quoting John Adams, Hannah Arendt emphasizes that when language artifacts are
instantiated through intersubjective dialogue and consent, they acquire palpable force: "A
Constitution is a standard, a pillar, and a bond when it is understood, approved and beloved.
But without this intelligence and attachment, it might as well be a kite or balloon, flying in the
air." HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 145 (1963) (quoting ZOLTAN HARASZTI, JOHN
ADAMS AND THE PROPHETS OF PROGRESS 221 (1952) (quoting John Adams)). On consent
and the uses of language, see Elaine Scarry, The Declaration of War: Constitutional and
Unconstitutional Violence, in LAW'S VIOLENCE 23 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,
1992).
97. The Federal Republic of Germany's 1992 military manual for all land-, sea-, and air-
based forces lists thirteen primarily treaty-based means for inducing obedience to international
law, none of which requires a transcendent violent enforcement mechanism. They include, for
instance, consideration of public opinion, fear of payment of compensation, international fact-
finding, and activities of protecting powers. See Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of
Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L 11, 18 (1995). For
more on the role of fact-finding commissions, see id. at 33. For an analysis of various
compliance and redress mechanisms, see generally MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN VENGEANCE
AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998);
MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE LAW (1997).
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A paradigmatic requirement of the Geneva Conventions is the
directive that the text of the Convention itself be posted in prisoner-
of-war camps, "in the prisoners' own language, in places where all
may read them."98 Such imperatives, a genre of command that might
be called the "communicative directives" of the Geneva
Conventions, are among the most common of its requirements. They
are also the least immediately intrusive and costly, and thus the least
plausibly disobeyed on economic grounds-contrast, for instance,
the regulation requiring medical inspections each month for each
prisoner. In Article 41 the language seeks to assure only its own
reproduction, to repeat and multiply itself like tangling verbal weeds
in the field of war-in effect acknowledging its simple visibility as a
primary source of its own enforcement. During war language is
censored, encrypted, and euphemized; imperatives replace dialogue,
and nations communicate their intentions most dramatically through
the use of injury rather than symbol; talks are broken off, individuals
are reduced to silence by traumatic experience, and witnesses are
exterminated. War's violence shrinks language and damages
communication; this diminishment of discourse (arguments, pleas,
justifications, appeals for sympathy) in turn enables further violence.
The Conventions thus prioritize the basic forms of language itself,
defending the rights of communication of prisoners,' for instance, or
insinuating themselves into the behavior of belligerents by requiring
exercises in language (trials, warnings) to precede exercises in force
(executions, bombings)."° The Conventions replace discourse-as-
coercion-as threats, intimidation, or lies-with morally coercive
discourse. They use language to interfere with force, to create gaps
and pauses that break up the momentum and self-amplification of
98. Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, art. 41, 6 U.S.T. at 3350, 75 U.N.T.S. at 168.
99. Jean-Franqois Lyotard writes: "Let us take it that the capacity to speak to others is a
human right, and perhaps the most fundamental human right." JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD,
The Other's Rights, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES, 1993, at 135,
140-41 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993). Robert Graves in his war memoirs recounts
his belief that language (chants, or bits of song) could actually protect him from violence. See
ROBERT GRAVES, GOOD-BYE TO ALL THAT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 179, 195 (Richard
Perceval Graves ed., 1995). Martin Ais, conversely, chillingly describes the capacity of
nuclear weapons to defeat human articulation. See MARTIN AMIS, EINSTEIN'S MONSTERS 22-
23 (1987).
100. For more, see Elaine Scarry's notion of the deliberative process as an impediment to
external violence. See Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract. Nuclear Policy, Distribution,
and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1257 (1991); see also ARENDT, supra note 80,
at 26-27 (discussing speech's displacement of violence); CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, UNCRITICAL
THEORY 59 (1992) (discussing how unconstrained public debate can work against the impulse
to war); JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 110-18, 223-27, 340-48 (1993) (discussing how
internal violence can be prevented through amplification and structuring of opportunities for
discourse); JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS
AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984) (discussing
the disintegration and reconstitution of language in a context of violence).
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violence. Examples abound. One provision, important because it is
so minutely prescriptive, requires that a belligerent publicly declare
if a certain locality is non-defended, requires in turn that the enemy
acknowledge receipt of this declaration, and requires finally that this
same enemy make a public declaration if it later ceases to interpret
this locality as non-defended."' In a sense what is most important
about the Geneva Conventions is not their substance but rather their
procedure: in other words, not their catalogue of rights but rather
their interior mechanisms for guaranteeing their own discursive
proliferation. Their effects derive from their magnification of
language and multiplication of opportunities for discourse. Thus, as
important as any specific declaration they make about the rightness
or wrongness of conduct during war, is their exhortation that the text
as a linguistic artifact be disseminated and repeated both in
wartime 1" and in peace. 13 For their repetition as a whole reproduces
on a larger scale the micro-function of accumulating bits of language
in any particular theater of action. Hence the article, repeated
identically in each of the four Conventions, which demands that
contracting states "disseminate the text of the present Convention as
widely as possible"-as if through unrelenting visibility the
Conventions finally could be internalized in belligerents, like a
reflex; as if through the sheer weight of verbal repetition the
Conventions could achieve material force.0"
Self-actualization proceeds not only through repetition and
procedural deceleration but also through clarity, or rather clarity as
101. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol One), June 7, 1977,
art. 59, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 30 [hereinafter Protocol I].
102. Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, art. 41, 6 U.S.T. at 3350, 75 U.N.T.S. at 168.
103. Id., art. 127, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236. See, e.g., PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
NATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES ON METHODS OF DISSEMINATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PRINCIPLES AND IDEALS OF THE RED
CROSS (Danuta Zys ed., 1983).
104. Geneva Convention I, supra note 12, art. 47, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62;
Geneva Convention II, supra note 12, art. 48, 6 U.S.T. at 3248, 75 U.N.T.S. at 114; Geneva
Convention III, supra note 12, art. 127, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236; Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 48, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 386.
105. For relevant material on building the structure of social reality, see SEARLE, supra
note 5, at 13. For more on the emphasis on implementation through education rather than
criminal prosecution, see Roberts, supra note 97, at 16. Written as a critique, the following
words by Mills also point to a potential hope for effectively internalizing restrained rules of
engagement that can limit the barbarity of war:
The military world bears decisively upon its inhabitants because it selects its recruits
carefully and breaks up their previously acquired values; it isolates them from civilian
society and it standardizes their career and deportment throughout their lives.... [I]t is
clearly a total way of life which is developed under an all-encompassing system of
discipline. Absorbed by the bureaucratic hierarchies in which he lives, and from which he
derives his very character and image of self, the military man is often submerged in it.
C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 194 (1956).
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visibility, as a form of pure intelligibility epitomized in the
Conventions' tendency toward producing discrete physical signs and
distinctive emblems-a red cross on a white ground (for medical
personnel)," three orange circles placed on the same axis (for
protected objects)," an equilateral blue triangle on an orange
ground (for civil defense)."° These sign systems establish inviolable
categories of persons, actions, and objects, thereby standing against
the confusion and border-disruption of war. Moreover, they create a
universally accessible, morally coercive language that works to
counter war's disarticulations, silences, and translation barriers.
The Geneva Conventions are a collection of definitions, a
dictionary of war with tirelessly detailed and comprehensive
explanations of seemingly self-announcing states and objects. A
"mercenary," for instance, is a belligerent who is recruited from an
uninvolved party and is rewarded financially-the definition as
written in the Convention, however, extends to sixteen lines.1" Other
typical definitions include "shipwrecked" (an eight-line definition),
"religious personnel" (twelve lines), "medical units" (ten lines),
"medical personnel" (sixteen lines), and "wounded" (eight lines).11
Through their plethora of definitions the Conventions work directly
against the object-confusion of war. For instance, they place special
focus upon establishing the principles that distinguish civilian objects
(tools) from military objectives (weapons)-hence discriminating
between a munitions depot and a food storage center, or even
between a bridge used for offensive purposes and a bridge used for
civilian purposes.'
At the center of the Geneva Conventions are these clear,
comprehensive definitions'- definitions that, importantly, precede
moral injunctions. The institutionalization of definitions is an
attempt to maximize language's fixed continuity with the material
world. The Conventions, writes Frits Kalshoven, do not offer
"protection against the violence of war itself, but against the
arbitrary power which one belligerent party acquires in the course of
106. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 12, art. 38, 6 U.S.T at 3140, 75 U.N.T.S. at 56.
107. See Protocol I, supra note 101, art. 56.7, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 28-29.
108. See id., art. 66.4, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 34.
109. Id., art 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
110. Id., art. 8,1125 U.N.T.S. at 10-11.
111. See KALSHOVEN, supra note 75, at 89-91.
112. Max Weber describes how law attempts to construct its own foundations, as if to
make interpretation impossible. He analyzes this search for a constructed "law without gaps."
MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 216-21 (H.H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1946). For more on the discursive
strategies used by international law to establish its own foundations, see DAVID KENNEDY,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987).
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the war over persons belonging to the other party.""' 3 The
Conventions set themselves up against arbitrary or unprincipled
power: in other words, against power unconstrained by the limits of
definitions -hence their harsh treatment of "perfidy," "feigning,"
and especially spies, who, because they disrupt the clarity of
signifiers upon which the law depends, are denied many of the
protections granted to prisoners of war. 4 With their hundreds of
pages of definitions and explanations-clarified, expanded, and
repeated time and time again over the decades-the Geneva
Conventions offer themselves as a sort of unmovable textual
monument."5
These points about rights language would be triumphantly clear if,
in contrast, the language of war consisted only of grunts and staccato
commands. But war broadly construed, as a cultural event that
extends beyond the battle theater to include domestic practice, is
decidedly full with rich and complex language, with indoctrination,
elaboration, justification, and propaganda. It might be argued here
that the Conventions, in fact, borrow from the structure of
propaganda (a discourse type essential to the theory of Blanchot).
There are important distinctions between the two, however, that are
related not only to the discursive procedures which produce them
but also, and more importantly, to the discursive procedures which
they in turn produce. War language and rights language differ both
in their treatment of certain widely recognized, minimal moral
norms, and in their treatment of three key features of communicative
legitimacy: intersubjectivity, objectivity, and referentiality. The
Geneva Conventions might thus best be viewed as producing a
counter-language to war, distinct for three reasons: first, because it is
directed toward establishing an overlapping vocabulary between
belligerents rather than simply enforcing linguistic conformity within
a community (intersubjectivity, or susceptibility to non-exclusionary
argument); second, because it is not instrumental to the actualization
of policy but is rather anterior to policy (objectivity, or partial
situational independence); and third, because it signifies consistently,
clearly, and narrowly rather than freely as the dictates of the
113. KALSHOVEN, supra note 75, at 40.
114. Protocol I, supra note 101, art. 37, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 10-11; Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 12, art. 5, 6 U.T.S. at 3520-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290-92. On the moral basis for the
illegality of disguises in war, see WALZER, supra note 63, at 183.
115. Some might argue that the exceedingly non-dramatic language of the Conventions
makes them less effective in promoting conformity to their dictates. Similar criticisms were
made of the textual strategies of Justice Robert Jackson during the Nuremberg Trials. In
contrast to Jackson's decision to compile Nazi records and allow these to speak for the
prosecution, the Soviet prosecutor Roman Rudenko chose to allow an almost therapeutic
outpouring of vivid witness testimony.
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moment demand (referentiality, or interpretive constraint through
the prioritization of pre-established external criteria)."6  The
Conventions, importantly, are a porous discourse: They set
boundaries to the play and "motion" of meaning but, at the same
time, avoid consolidating an impermeable epistemic power. That is,
they remain adaptive to context and susceptible to change both in
their application (by creating a communicative structure within and
between belligerent parties where alternative interpretations can be
tested1 7) and in their development (by establishing a tradition of
revisability that is based upon a consensus-oriented dialogue
between nations) - but they do so within a practice of referential
fixity.
The Geneva Conventions, like battle commanders attempting to
control the uncertainty of the future with a painstaking matrix of
controlled language in the present,"' establish in expansive detail
what it means to be a combatant, attack, civilian or prisoner, as if
with this multitude of definitions they can render the chaos of war
susceptible to the control of language. Unlike battle commanders,
however, the Conventions do not seek to control the development of
war by controlling a synchronic array of disconnected speech-acts,
but by controlling the constitutive language system of the
warmakers. If we call the Germans "enemy," "criminal," or "animal"
we enable ourselves to feel about and act towards them in a certain
way; if we instead call them "combatant," "prisoner of war" or
"civilian" (agent-neutral terms that could easily be used to describe
us or our own families), we are forced by the pressure of our own
lexicon to think about and act toward them in a drastically different
fashion. Those like Sherman who would point to the emptiness of
any concept of law in war argue that people in danger are naturally
selfish, frightened, and murderous. War devolves into savagery
because humans, stripped naked and freed from the constraints of
civilization, are essentially vicious."9 The culture of laws, in contrast,
116. The full question of the legitimacy of "minimal moral norms" (how these norms are
produced and whether or not it might be considered a matter of uncontroversial general utility
that they benefit from these strategies of repetition, clarity, and comprehensiveness) is, of
course, a question far beyond the scope of this Article. I would provisionally suggest, along
Habermasian lines, that one can distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate moral norms
by looking at how they align with the three discursive criteria I have listed above, both in terms
of their development and their communicative legacies.
117. See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, arts. 99-108, 6 U.S.T. at 3392-3400, 75
U.N.T.S. at 210-18 (establishing the requirements of judicial proceedings).
118. See JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE 266 (1977).
119. David Grossman, quoting Gwinne Dyer, argues in contrast that "Conditioning, almost
in the Pavlovian sense," is necessary to overcome our deep-rooted resistance to intraspecific
violence. The laws of war can be conceived of as counter-conditioning to a training that makes
soldiers "kill without hesitation." DAVID GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
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depends upon no strong theory of human "nature." The institutional
discourse of rights, like any ideology, is a lived relation to the real; it
provides a structure of intelligibility to experience that is increasingly
naturalized as the persuasive force of representations accumulate. It
is thus the premise of the Geneva Conventions, in a contrast to
Sherman's "realism" which is not, importantly, idealistic, that war
devolves into savagery not because savagery is the nature of humans,
but rather because war confuses us. In war we are strangers in a
strange land, bereft of language and of the borders that regulate
social meaning. The routine human rights violations of war, an
attorney of international law might argue, are thus in many cases not
so much viciousness as they are mistakes-mistakes born of the same
epistemological disruption and reversals that allow soldiers to
understand killing an enemy as "ending the war" and that allowed
American commanders successfully to conceptualize the bombing of
civilian neighborhoods in Japan as "saving American lives.1
120
The laws of war are about avoiding conflation and making clear
distinctions; they are about the moral imperative to discriminate and
about the morality enabled by the act of discrimination.121 In 1968 the
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 2444,
which endorsed what it considered to be the three most fundamental,
incontrovertible principles of the laws of war. 2 2 Two of the three
concerned the "principle of distinction": namely that combatants are
required to discriminate between military objectives and civilians
and are prohibited from targeting the latter." This principle received
its most recent restatement in Article 51 of the 1977 Geneva
Protocol I:
The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians,
shall not be the object of attack .... Indiscriminate attacks are
prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are... those which employ a
method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be
limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each
COST OF LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY 18 (1995) (quoting Gwinne Dyer)
(emphasis in original).
120. Jean Elshtain emphasizes the words of Marisa Masu in describing this tendency to
represent killing as "defense, preservation, life saving": "Each Nazi I killed... shortened the
length of the war and saved the lives of all women and children." JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN,
WOMEN AND WAR 179 (1987). She continues: "Gary Cooper's Sergeant York, in the 1941
movie, says the same thing when he is asked about his record-breaking German sniping and
prisoner taking. He did it to try to hasten the end of the thing and to save lives. The sooner it
stops, the sooner the killing stops." Id.
121. For a discussion of the doctrine of discrimination and in particular non-combatant
immunity, see ROBERT PHILLIPS, WAR AND JUSTICE 20-70 (1984).
122. G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., reprinted in 12 UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS 164, 164-65 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1975) (1968).
123. See id.
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such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and
civilians or civilian objects without distinction."'
Any attack is by nature indiscriminate that disrupts the conceptual
borders established in the law, either by treating "as a single military
objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military
objectives," or by causing excessive "incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof."" This Protocol restatement is actually a radical revision of
the inherited principle of distinction."6 Earlier formulations centered
upon the concept of aiming, thus prohibiting the subjective intent
directly to harm particular categories of non-combatants. In other
words, you were permitted to kill civilians as long as you could
successfully argue that you had not consciously intended to make
them a direct target of your assault. It had been the strategy of
lawmakers since the inception of the ICRC and the Geneva
Conventions to eschew the murkiness of such subjectivity, to resist
slipping into an idiom of culturally specific appellations and
subjective evaluations by instead constructing a language of
universal categories and objective measurements (hence part of the
controversy around introducing to the later Protocols the category of
mercenaries, a group that can only be distinguished by its members'
unique internal motivations for going to war).127 The revision in
Article 51 ingeniously overcame distinction's vexed problem of
subjectivity by pointing to the "method and means of combat" rather
than the intent of the combatant as the relevant evidence in
determining the threshold of discrimination.'" The attacking soldier
124. Protocol I, supra note 101, art. 51, 1156 U.N.T.S. at 26.
125. Id.
126. On the doctrine of distinction and its moral basis (particularly in relation to nuclear
weapons), see WALZER, supra note 63, at 200, 203, 280.
127. One possible critique of international law would focus upon its attempt to achieve
departicularization. Consider Seyla Benhabib's critique of neo-Kantian political theory, which,
she argues, elevates abstract categories of the self over personalized identities and stories. See
Seyla Benhabib, The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics, 35 NEW GERMAN
CRITIQUE 83. Vdclav Havel, in a different context, writes of the destruction of referentiality:
A typical example is how reality can be liquidated with the help of a false
"contextualization": the praiseworthy attempt to see things in their wider context
becomes so formalized that instead of applying that technique in particular, unique ways,
appropriate to a given reality, it becomes a single and widely used model of thinking with
a special capacity to dissolve-in the vagueness of all the possible wider contexts-
everything particular in that reality. Thus what looks like an attempt to see something in
a complex way in fact results in a complex form of blindness. For if we can't see
individual, specific things, we can't see anything at all.
VACLAV HAVEL, On Evasive Thinking, in OPEN LETrERS: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1965-1990,
at 13 (Paul Wilson ed. & A.G. Brain trans., Vintage Books 1992) (1989).
128. Samuel Huntington emphasizes the evacuation of subjectivity from military thinking:
In estimating the security threats the military man looks at the capabilities of other states
rather than at their intentions. Intentions are political in nature, inherently fickle and
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as thinking human becomes irrelevant, or rather, his thoughts are
now deemed transparent, regarded as taking shape through the
weapons that give his subjectivity content. This is a striking moment;
it gives us the opportunity for a thought experiment: namely, to trace
the logic of a literary theoretical critique of the law's language, and
to evaluate its methods and results. In this almost imperceptible
textual rupture, one might argue, the article mandating distinction
proceeds by treating civilians and civilian objects without distinction:
"military objectives and civilians or civilian objects"-and again, "or
a combination thereof." Here the text seems vulnerable to
hermeneutic practices instrumentally oriented toward the
destabilization of referentiality. The easy substitutability and
hierarchy-erasing nature of Article 51's "or" (a civilian or an object)
reproduces its earlier "objective" elision of the combatant into the
weapon. Thinning out the distinctions between humans and their
objects, Article 51 describes the site of war by using categories so
broad and inclusive (weapons of attack and objects of attack) as to
be "indiscriminate." This rhetorical slippage points to an associated
set of larger category crises in human rights discourse. Replacing the
particular with the general, the private with the common, and the
subjective with the objective, international law (it can be argued)
invokes the participation of selves devoid of personhood, and of
cultural and linguistic thickness. It therefore creates an ethics based
on an achromatic duty rather than respect; it institutes an empty
formalism that obliterates the space of difference, of the individual,
the unique, and the context-dependent. Relatedly, international
law's use of language and concepts abstract enough to be widely
applicable and inclusive of widely divergent cultures and cultural
formulations (a universalism of the lowest common denominator)
works counter to its effort to reify moral borders through precise and
impermeable classification and specification. Here, in Article 51, the
law's "universality" bears the traces of the grotesque. The
battleground is a junk heap of objects and weapons that deploy
themselves, as in a scene from Hemingway. And the individual will is
displaced as arbiter of meaning by the consequences deemed
inherent to the equipment there employed. The logic of war against
which the Conventions set themselves is this very tendency to
devalue individual subjectivity, to make humans into collectible,
changeable, and virtually impossible to evaluate and predict. The military man is
professionally capable of estimating the fighting strength of another state.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 66 (1985). Thomas C. Schelling
writes that in the conduct of war punitive measures (i.e., threats) must be indexed against
visible deeds and quantifiable actions rather than against intentions. See THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CoNFLICT 40-41 (1980).
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countable, and disposable things. And yet here, unexpectedly, a
strange confluence is revealed between the two. For a striking and
suggestive moment, the Conventions seem to operate not so much
athwart as within the assumptions of war. The humanitarian treaties
and organized butchery work together: War's instru-
mentalization/dehumanization and law's universalization/de-
particularization both serve to objectify (to make into an object; to
make objective). Violence and its other, in a word commingled,
achieve grotesque synthesis.
There is, indeed, a long history to international law's kinship with
its infractions. The contemporary international laws of war spring in
a large part from the early Christian Church's effort to codify a
notion of "the just war." This essentially theological tradition of jus
ad bellum laws, dating from the works of St. Ambrose and St.
Augustine, establishes rigorous standards for determining when it is
justifiable to enter into a war.'29 The jus ad bellum tradition is
generally characterized as a matter of prohibiting certain forms of
war-a humanitarian endeavor, by all accounts. Analyzed in the
context of the Church's earliest history, however, it must be seen that
the tradition developed instead as a means of permitting and even
facilitating certain types of warfare."3 Early Christianity was strictly
pacifist: Believers, Origen wrote, were permitted to fight for the
King only "by offering.., prayers to God.''. It was only after
Emperor Theodosius I declared that Catholic Christianity was the
state religion of the Roman empire, only after the formerly
marginalized believers found themselves repositioned at the center
of the state apparatus, that Christian thinkers adulterated their
pacific beliefs -essentially in order to make themselves amenable to
the needs of a militaristic empire.'32 The laws of war from their
inception functioned as much to justify violence as to prohibit it.
Centuries later, things are much the same. The United States, for
instance, managed to quell much of the criticism and dissent against
its war with Iraq by asserting through selective video evidence that
its use of "smart" weapons complied fully with Geneva restrictions:
indeed, complied to such an unprecedented extent that the war could
be imagined as "clean" and almost casualty-less.'33 The Conventions
129. See MAURICE H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 65 (1993).
130. On Christianity's evolution to a state-oriented, war-making religion, see ROBERT
PHILLIPS, WAR AND JUSTICE 5-9 (1984).
131. ORIGEN, CONTRA CELSUM 557 (H. Chadwick ed. & trans., 1953), quoted in
SHELDON BAILEY, PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN WAR 3 (1972).
132. On the possible collusion between just war ethics and the perpetuation of war, see
DAVID SMOCK, RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON WAR at xvii (1992).
133. For more on the legitimating function of the laws of war during the 1990-91 Gulf War,
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can be turned into a weapon for any military's propaganda arsenal.
More radical critiques argue, however, that it is not the strategic
misuse of the laws of war but rather their essential nature that
facilitates violence. Clausewitz argued that war executed without pity
or hesitation achieved "absolute perfection."'" His aesthetics of war,
produced with the painstaking moral neutrality of the pure observer,
nonetheless encloses within itself a counter-intuitive ethical
argument: Were all wars fought with the merciless speed of
Bonaparte, he implies, they would be both shorter and scarcer.'35
Echoing Clausewitz, Sherman wrote:
If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will
answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking .... Indeed,
the larger the cost now, the less will it be in the end; for the end
must be attained somehow, regardless of loss of life and
treasure, and is merely a question of time."
Sherman denied the notion of civilian neutrality and treated the
Confederacy instead as a "nation-in-arms." Using starvation as a
weapon and taking the war to civilians, the logic goes, broke the will
of the Confederacy and, by ending the war early, saved the lives of
thousands of conscripted and confused young men. After the
Vietnam War, American frustrations and anxieties over the notion
of limitations in war manifested itself in a plenitude of diverse
cultural texts. Among the most widely disseminated was Star Trek's
"A Taste of Armageddon" television episode: Here, explorers
encounter a civilization that has circumscribed so radically the
conduct of one particular war that, despite its inordinate casualties, it
is no longer perceived as unbearable and so is never brought to a
close. This popular allegory of the Geneva Conventions trenchantly
contrasts honest, human barbarism with the measured and bloodless
scientific detachment of those aliens who would quantify
"appropriate" levels of carnage.37 Frits Kalshoven, legal adviser of
international affairs to the Netherlands Red Cross Society,
acknowledges this concern:
Does... the very existence of the humanitarian law of armed
conflicts perhaps contribute to perpetuating the phenomenon of
war? Would war made "unbearable beyond endurance" make
see Roberts, supra note 97, at 11, 48-49. For a discussion of the computerization of modem war
and the decoupling of human sacrifice from war, see CHRIS HABLES GRAY, POSTMODERN
WAR: THE NEW POLMCS OF CONFLICT (1997).
134. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 61, at 21.
135. See id. at 580-81.
136. SHERMAN, supra note 56, at 585, 367.
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mankind realize that the situation cannot go on unchanged and
that war in all its manifestations, no matter how just its cause,
must be effectively banned from the face of the earth?138
The rhetorical slippage in Article 51 between persons, tools, and
weapons emblematizes war's continuing disruption of
epistemological and linguistic borders. The disturbing referential
destabilization and category dissolution of wartime experience
manifests itself not only in the particular shreds of language we have
analyzed, but also in the larger purposes of the Conventions
themselves. Just as any tool may become a weapon, so may law
become propaganda, and so may a treaty of peace become an
instigator of war. The unpredictably multiple functioning of all
artifacts, including these treaties, forces the question: Are the
Conventions tools to minimize violence, or weapons to justify it? Is
there, finally, any way to tell the difference?
Many in the human rights community perceive theory as a threat.139
But has not this theoretically generated analysis identifying the
possible prolongation of atrocities through the laws of war shown
otherwise? Could not a recognition of the radical heterogeneity of
signification enable a deep-structure critique of certain unquestioned
discourses that might actually be contributing to human rights
violations? A compelling defense for a selectively deployed theory
might be made along these lines. Although I believe the substantive
argument and the textual distortions that generated it are
unacceptable and unsound (both as method and as morals), a revised
form of their interior logics need not be. Theory as social practice
might be conceived minimally as a plea for humility, and as an
injunction to continually re-expose our assumptions to critical
analysis. Theory, as thought experiment, is the pause between
consideration and judgment. But is not such a "disposable" theory
just a version of Ernest Gellner's "Enlightenment rationalism"" in
rhetorical disguise?
A difference remains. As humanists we may wish for the
theoretical pause to be as long and rich as possible, but in the end a
judgment must be made. Provisional foundationalists and
antifoundationalists alike, of course, accept this last point.' They
138. KALSHOVEN, supra note 75, at 2.
139. See, e.g., Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74
TEx. L. REv. 523, (1996); Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Right Rights, NEW REPUBLIC, June 15,
1998, at 11; Lilla, supra note 22.
140. GELLNER, supra note 6, at 86.
141. It is important to distinguish between dogmatic foundationalism and provisional
foundationalism. Provisional foundationalists (that is, the rationalist mainstream) do not
believe that they have found Truth, but rather that they have put together a chain of moral
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disagree, however, in their characterization of this act of judgment.
Antifoundationalists assert that judgments across cultures can have
no moral or philosophical legitimacy, insofar as this connotes
universal reason or an evaluative standpoint above the conditions of
its own enunciation. In the end, such judgments must instead be
conceived of as questions of force rather than of right: Can we force
"them" to be like "us," and is it worth it?' 2 The ambiguity of "force"
here is deliberate-it incorporates the wide spectrum of persuasion,
manipulation, and coercion. This blending generates resistance from
human rights activists, justifiably, for their project depends upon
taking very seriously the distinctions among the three.' 3 A deeper
critique from rights-thinkers, however, argues that the
antifoundationalist theory of judgment is incompatible with almost
any particular antifoundationalist's system of belief.
Antifoundationalists do not merely experience belief; they endorse
their beliefs. In other words, antifoundationalists do not feel
compelled to abhor atrocity because they recognize it as
incompatible with the values of their contingent cultural
indoctrination (an indoctrination they can recognize but not rise
above) but rather because they believe it to be wrong.'" If
antifoundationalists are comfortable with an incompatibility between
their beliefs and their beliefs about their beliefs, which Simon
Critchley has called "an impossible psychological bi-cameralism,"
then human rights activists are not, if only because such ironic
determinism is a "recipe for political cynicism" rather than for action
and sacrifice.'45
Is the naming function of language recognitional or coercive? The
justification, composed of widely accessible reasons, that goes further than other systems into
the infinite regress of knowledge's pursuit.
142. On this complex issue, see HARPHAM, supra note 15, at 27-30 (pointing to the
instability of Stanley Cavell's distinction, previously discussed, between the moralist and the
propagandist, between convincing and persuading).
143. On the blending of the multiple conceptions of force, see STANLEY FISH, DOING
WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN
LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 519-20 (1989).
144. As Ronald Dworkin writes of antifoundationalists in law:
They say there are no right answers but only different answers to hard questions of law,
that insight is finally subjective, that it is only what seems right, for better or worse, to the
particular judge on the day. But this modesty in fact contradicts what they say first, for
when judges finally decide one way or another they think their arguments better than,
not merely different from, arguments the other way; though they may think this with
humility, wishing their confidence were greater or their time for decision longer, this is
nevertheless their belief.
RONALD DwORmNu, LAW'S EMPIRE 10 (1986).
145. Simon Critchley, Deconstruction and Pragmatism-Is Derrida a Private Ironist or a
Public Liberal?, in DECONSTRUCTION AND PRAGMATISM, supra note 6, at 19, 25. For more on
beliefs about beliefs, see Gerald Cohen, Beliefs and Roles, 66 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
SOC'Y, 1966-67, at 53-66.
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bulk of this Article has been devoted to identifying and justifying the
urgent sense in the human rights community that collective goals of
the highest priority, which center around the protection of the most
vulnerable, depend upon a concerted and continuous effort to
stabilize our most basic moral categories along with the language
that constitutes them. Whether or not one finally accepts these moral
categories as foundational or rationally required, grounded
procedurally in the workings of our autonomy as Kant argued or in
the structure of discourse as Habermas argues,' it is at the very least
in our collective self-interest to treat them as if they were real."7 As
146. Karl Mannheim argues against the reestablishment of foundational truths, no matter
how benign, insofar as they depend upon a false naturalization. He writes:
To find people in our day attempting to pass off to the world and recommending to
others some nostrum of the absolute which they claim to have discovered is merely a sign
of the loss of and the need for intellectual and moral certainty, felt by broad sections of
the population who are unable to look life in the face.
MANNHEIM, supra note 15, at 77; see also id. at 85-86. Habermas argues that his
foundationalism offers an alternative to deconstruction without reproducing Enlightenment
errors. He writes:
A different, less dramatic, but step-by-step testable critique of the Western emphasis on
logos starts from an attack on the abstractions surrounding logos itself, as free of
language, as universalist, and as disembodied. It conceives of intersubjective
understanding as the telos inscribed into communication in ordinary language, and of the
logocentrism of Western thought, heightened by the philosophy of consciousness, as a
systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the
communicative practice of everyday life, but only selectively exploited.
HABERMAS, supra note 95, at 311. He continues:
This communicative rationality recalls older ideas of logos, inasmuch as it brings along
with it the connotations of a noncoercively unifying, consensus-building force of a
discourse in which the participants overcome their at first subjectively biased views in
favor of a rationally motivated agreement. Communicative reason is expressed in a
decentered understanding of the world.
Id. at 315. Habermas argues that theorists who use argument as a means of disproving
rationality or any other of the premises of argumentation are caught in a "performative
contradiction." Jurgen Habermas, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical
Justification, in THE COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS CONTROVERSY 60,78 (Seyla Benhabib & Fred
Dallmayr eds., 1990). From this he derives his notion of discourse ethics as foundational to the
structure of human communication. See, e.g., Fred Dallmayr, Introduction to THE
COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS CONTROVERSY, supra, at 1, 8-9. Against Habermas, see BUTLER,
supra note 1, at 86-87, 92-93, 161.
147. In his later work even Derrida has appeared to adopt positions increasingly similar to
Habermas's original position on discursive ethics as a non-deconstructable foundation. See
Jacques Derrida, Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism, in DECONSTRUCTION AND
PRAGMATISM, supra note 6, at 77, 82. Stanley Fish, in contrast, argues that we need to retain
and reaffirm concepts such as justice, fairness, and dignity only for pragmatic reasons. In
abandoning them, he argues,
We would suffer a loss, not just because justice, fairness, and human dignity will have
been lost-I believe them to be rhetorical constructions just as Posner does-but because
we will have deprived ourselves of the argumentative resources those abstractions now
stand for; we would no longer be able to say "what justice requires" or "what fairness
dictates" and then fill in those phrases with the courses of action we prefer to take. That,
after all, is the law's job-to give us ways of redescribing limited partisan programs so
that they can be presented as the natural outcomes of abstract impersonal imperatives.
FISH, supra note 15, at 222. For a historical philosophical analysis of premises arguably related
to Fish's antifoundationalism, see MACINTYRE, supra note 28, at 16-22 (discussing emotivism).
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William James would have argued, it is the act of treating them as
real that makes them real. Lacking the signatures of belief and
reaffirmation, words do indeed require Hobbes's sword for
actualization. But treated as real in the overlapping consensus of a
non-exclusionary intersubjective discourse, they become real: real
without coercion, and with the key feature of susceptibility to
argument.
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